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Abstract 
 
While  it is recognized  that the  family is primarily  an institution for risk sharing,  little  is 
known about  the quantitative effects of this informal source of insurance  on savings and labor 
supply.   In  this  paper,  we present  a  model  where  workers (females  and  males)  are  subject 
to idiosyncratic employment risk and  where capital  markets  are incomplete.   A household  is 
formed  by a female and  a male,  who make collective decisions on consumption, savings and 
labor supplies.  We find that intra-household risk sharing  has its largest  impact  among wealth- 
poor households.   While the wealth-rich use mainly savings to smooth consumption across 
unemployment spells, wealth-poor  households  rely on spousal labor supply.  For instance,  for 
low-wealth  households,  average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8% higher 
than  those worked by wives of employed husbands. This response in wives’ hours makes up 9% 
of lost family income.  We also study the crowding out effects of public unemployment insurance 
on other  sources of private  insurance,  and consumption losses upon an unemployment spell. 
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1 
1 Introduction
The lack of a formal, private insurance market against employment risk makes this type of risk
different from most of others faced by individuals. Even though public, compulsory unemployment
insurance schemes are present in many countries, they typically fall short of providing full insur-
ance and workers must rely on self-insurance and on informal insurance mechanisms in order to
smooth consumption across unemployment spells. Precautionary savings is the main instrument
individuals can use as self-insurance against employment risk. The family, on the other hand,
is the main informal insurance mechanism available to individuals, as information and payment
enforceability are better within than between households.1
In this paper, we present an incomplete markets economy with idiosyncratic employment risk and
assess quantitatively the role of the family as provider of insurance. Intra-household risk sharing,
more than any other informal insurance mechanism, has important behavioral implications that
affect not only the demand for self insurance, but also how this is crowded out by public insurance
programs. Indeed, recent empirical evidence on patterns of insurance against employment risk
sheds light on these crowding out effects. More specifically, using a large panel of U.S. households,
Cullen and Gruber (2000) and Engen and Gruber (2001) estimate the response in two forms
of insurance —accumulation of financial assets and spousal labor supply— to changes in the
generosity of public unemployment insurance (UI) and find significant crowding out effects on
both. The extent to which public insurance crowds out other forms of (private) insurance is of
paramount importance for public policy assessment.2
Our model economy consists of a large number of two-person households, each pooling risks and
making collective decisions on individual consumptions, labor supplies and joint savings in a risk-
free asset, subject to a borrowing constraint. Risk sharing within the two-person household is
assumed to be efficient, with individual weights in the household’s utility function determined,
among other variables, by their relative earning ability. There is a firms sector producing a
homogeneous good with capital and labor services, and a government providing UI.
In order to assess the consequences of within-household risk sharing, the equilibrium in this
economy is compared to that arising in an economy where individuals lack access to insurance
from the family and are left with self-insurance and UI as their only instruments to cope with
employment risk. This latter framework corresponds to a standard Aiyagari-Huggett economy
augmented with a labor-leisure choice, which has been studied by, e.g., Flode´n and Linde´ (2001),
1Blundell et al. (2008) estimate the degree of consumption insurance from U.S. data and find evidence that the
family plays an important insurance role. See also Shore (2010) for an empirical analysis of family risk sharing over
the business cycle.
2See, e.g., Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) and Chetty and Saez (2010) for analyses
on the optimal level of social insurance when other forms of private insurance are also available.
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Marcet et al. (2007) and Pijoan-Mas (2006), among others. In addition to serving as a reference
against which our collective household economy can be compared, the Aiyagari-Huggett model
is shown to largely overestimate the measure of precautionary savings against employment risk
found by Engen and Gruber (2001). This is an indication that this latter model embodies far less
insurance opportunities than those available to U.S. households.
The equilibrium of our model economy contains a distribution of households over financial assets
and spouses’ employment status, and we can thus assess the effects of intra-household risk sharing
for different groups of households. Since intra-household risk sharing has its largest impact among
low-wealth households, special attention is devoted to households with financial assets below two
months of average income. This is the group that Zeldes (1989) termed as liquidity-constrained
households, and that represent almost 20% of total U.S. households in 2001.
Our first question addresses the extent to which our model with family insurance can account for
patterns of insurance against employment risk observed across U.S. households. The first exercise
mimics the empirical work conducted by Engen and Gruber (2001), which regresses households’
assets on UI and finds an elasticity of the assets-to-income ratio with respect to the generosity of
UI equal to −0.28. This elasticity provides a measure of the precautionary savings motive, and
also of the crowding out effects of UI on households’ financial wealth. In a calibration version of
our model with family insurance this elasticity is −0.38, in contrast to an elasticity of −0.64 we
find in the Aiyagari-Huggett model. This suggests that abstracting from risk sharing at the level
of the household introduces an important bias in this elasticity.
We then inquire on the use of spousal labor supply as an insurance mechanism, and on the mag-
nitude of consumption losses upon an unemployment spell. Our first finding is that while the
wealth rich use savings to smooth consumption across unemployment spells, wealth-poor house-
holds rely on spousal labor supply. For instance, in the group of liquidity-constrained households
(using Zeldes’ (1989) definition), average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8%
higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands. This response in wives’ hours makes
up 9% of lost family income. The implications of family insurance for consumption losses upon
unemployment are sizable, especially for low-wealth households. For instance, we find that a
liquidity-constrained male lacking insurance from the family suffers a consumption loss of 30%,
while the same male suffers a loss of 8% when given access to family insurance. When we com-
pute the fraction of household income loss that translates into household consumption loss for
liquidity-constrained households, we find 35% under no family insurance, and 17% with family
insurance.
We include two applications and one extension of our model. First, we assess the value of intra-
household risk sharing. As suggested by our results above, this value is higher for individuals in
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low-wealth households. As an example, the value of family insurance to an unemployed individual
with an employed spouse and no assets represents more than 5% of per period consumption of
a similar individual with no family insurance. This value decreases with the level of wealth.
Second, we study the consequences of family insurance for optimal UI and find that it is one
of its key determinants. If we compute optimal UI for households with different wealth levels,
instead of focusing on ex-ante utility, we find that family insurance creates a wedge in optimal
replacement rates that decreases with wealth. For instance, the optimal replacement rate for the
average two-person household with no assets is 15%, while this rate increases to 60% for a similar
household lacking family insurance. This wedge closes at wealth levels equal to six months of
average income. As an extension, we introduce marital shocks in our benchmark model so that
married and single households co-exist. Within this framework we study the robustness of our
results on intra-household risk sharing, the implications of marital risk on households’ savings,
and compute consumption losses upon employment and/or marital shocks.
There is a vast literature —too large to be discussed here— assessing the effects of idiosyncratic
income risk on consumption, labor supply and savings. Most of this literature adopts the bachelor
household formulation to study individual responses to income shocks, and the extent of self-
insurance. A recent example of this type of exercise is the paper by Low et al. (2008). These
authors assume that individuals (they focus only on males) are subject to a rich array of idiosyn-
cratic shocks, including productivity and employment shocks. These shocks are assumed to differ
in their available insurance opportunities (employment shocks are partially insured by public UI
while productivity shocks are not). The authors then use a bachelor household model to assess
the effects of these shocks and the individual willingness to pay to avoid them. Since they consider
endogenous mobility choices, their paper extends previous results in the literature by adding a
new channel from shocks to individual responses to shocks.
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) is one of the first papers in economics to study the family as a
provider of insurance to its members. In their model unexpected longevity is the only risk faced
by individuals. They show that within-household efficient risk-sharing closes much of the utility
gap between no annuities and complete annuities. For example, the utility gain of marriage at
age 30 is about 50% of the utility gain of an annuities market.
A more recent exception to the use of the bachelor household formulation is the work of Attanasio
et al. (2005), who present a partial equilibrium model with a two-person, unitary household
to assess the response of female labor market participation (extensive margin) to idiosyncratic
earnings risk within the family. While male participation is exogenous, female participation is
endogenous and assumed to affect her human capital formation. The authors find that the higher
the uncertainty, the higher female participation. They also find that the welfare cost of uncertainty
is lower when households can adjust female labor market participation.
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Heathcote et al. (2010) also use a two-person, unitary household model to study the welfare
implications of the observed changes in the U.S. wage structure. In particular, they present
an incomplete-markets, life-cycle model to quantify the effects of the rising college premium,
the narrowing wage gender gap and the increasing wage volatility. Their model allows for an
endogenous education choice and for a process matching females and males into households. Even
though the welfare consequences of the above-mentioned changes in wages are highly heterogeneous
across different types of households, they find that, on average, recent cohorts of households enjoy
welfare gains, as the new structure of wages translates into higher educational attainment.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment,
defines the steady-state equilibrium, and presents some properties of decision rules for collective
households. It also presents a parameterization and calibration of this economy, and shows results
on the role played by intra-household risk sharing. Section 3 contains our results on how family
insurance shapes the effects of changes in public insurance. Section 4 presents some extensions
and applications, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Economic Environment
Consumers The economy is populated by a continuum of measure two of infinitely-lived con-
sumers. Half of this population is referred to as females (f), and the other half as males (m).
They supply time to work in the firms sector and face idiosyncratic risk in the form of employ-
ment shocks. Employment shocks, s, take on values in S ≡ {0, 1} and follow a Markov chain with
transition matrix Πi, for i = f,m. Thus, piis′|s is the probability for an agent of gender i to receive
employment shock s′ tomorrow conditional on employment shock s today. These probabilities
satisfy
∑
s′ pi
i
s′|s = 1, pi
i
s′|s > 0, and pi
i
1|1 ≥ pii1|0 for i = f,m. The long-run probabilities of the two
employment shocks in S are denoted by qi0 and q
i
1. There are no others shocks in the economy.
Markets are incomplete. Households can save in a non-state-contingent asset, a, that pays the
risk-free interest rate r. There is a borrowing constraint represented by a ≥ a.
Lifetime preferences for an agent of gender i over stochastic consumption and leisure streams are
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU i(ct, lt), for i = f,m, (2.1)
where ct denotes consumption and lt is leisure. We make the following assumptions on U
i: A1)
Utility U i(c, l) : R+×[0, 1]→ R is bounded, continuous and twice continuously differentiable in its
interior. A2) U i is separable in consumption and leisure. A3) U i is strictly increasing and strictly
concave in each of its arguments. Moreover, limc→0 U ic(c, l) = +∞, and liml→0 U il (c, l) = +∞.
Firms The aggregate good is produced by competitive firms with neoclassical production function
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F (K,L), where K is the aggregate stock of capital and L is aggregate labor. Capital depreciates
at rate δ > 0. Aggregate labor is defined as L ≡ λLm+(1−λ)Lf , where 0 < λ < 1 is a parameter.
Given r and gross wage rates w¯f and w¯m, the firm’s first-order conditions are:
FK(K,L) = r + δ (2.2)
λFL(K,L) = w¯
m (2.3)
(1− λ)FL(K,L) = w¯f . (2.4)
Public Insurance A public unemployment insurance scheme (UI) pays out bi, for i = f,m, to
workers hit by the unemployment shock. UI is financed on a period-by-period basis with taxes on
labor income.
2.1 The Bachelor versus the Collective Household Model
We consider two different risk-sharing arrangements, each of them defining in turn a different
type of household. We start out by presenting the problem of the bachelor household. This is
the definition of household that has dominated not only the literature on precautionary savings,
but also most of the macroeconomic literature. A single breadwinner chooses sequences of con-
sumption, leisure and asset holdings in order to maximize his/her own lifetime utility. In most
studies adopting this framework, the income process is estimated using data on males. The second
type of household we study is a dynamic version of the collective household model pioneered by
Chiappori (1988). A household is formed by two individuals who make collective decisions on con-
sumptions, labor supplies and savings. In order to understand the consequences of intra-household
risk sharing we compare the allocations generated by these two household arrangements.
Bachelor Households A household formed by a single agent of gender i solves
vi(s, a;wi, r) = max
c,l,a′
{
U i(c, l) + β
∑
s′
piis′|sv
i(s′, a′;wi, r)
}
(2.5)
s.t. c+ a′ = wi(1− l)s+ (1− s)bi + (1 + r)a (2.6)
c ≥ 0, 0 ≤ l ≤ 1, and a′ ∈ [ai, a¯], (2.7)
where piis′|s are the elements of Π
i and wi = (1 − τ i)w¯i denotes after-tax wage rates. A version
of this model, where there is a measure one of same-gender workers, is the workhorse model in
the literature of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, precautionary savings and labor supply.3 By con-
struction, the bachelor household does not engage in informal insurance arrangements with other
workers. The only sources of insurance available to this type of household are public insurance,
own savings and own labor supply.
3See, e.g., Flode´n and Linde´ (2001), Marcet et al. (2007) and Pijoan-Mas (2006).
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Collective Households We now consider two-person, collective households formed by an egotis-
tical female and an egotistical male who share labor market risk and reach efficient intra-household
allocations. Following the literature of collective households (see Chiappori and Donni 2010 for a
recent survey), the utility of each individual in the household carries a weight, reflecting her/his
relative power in the household. Individual weights are assumed to depend on variables such as
the population sex ratio, relative earnings and public insurance. Under full commitment to future
intra-household allocations, individual weights are set when the household is formed and remain
unchanged thereafter. Thus, transitory shocks, which are small relative to lifetime income, are
assumed to have no effect on individual weights. Only variables known or predicted at the time of
household formation can affect those weights.4 We write the Pareto weight on females’ utility as
µ(x, z) ∈ (0, 1), where function µ is assumed to be differentiable with respect to its first argument.
Variable x is a measure of the relative earning ability of the two spouses, which we write as,
x ≡ q
f
1 (1− τ f )w¯f + qf0 bf
qm1 (1− τm)w¯m + qm0 bm
, (2.8)
where qji is the long-run probability of employment state i for an agent of gender j. I.e., there are
four sources of female-male earnings differences that affect relative Pareto weights: 1) Different
gross wages; 2) Different tax rates; 3) Different levels of UI; and, 4) Finally, females and males may
be subject to different employment and unemployment spells. Vector z includes variables such
as the population sex ratio, the initial contribution to household wealth, etc., which we do not
model explicitly in this paper. In our model the Pareto weight function, µ(x, z), is not obtained
as the outcome of an explicit bargaining process between females and males.5 Instead, we will use
estimates by Browning et al. (1994) to pin down the derivative of µ with respect to x.
Household-level state variables for the two-person, collective household are the vector of employ-
ment shocks, s = (sf , sm), and the level of asset holdings, a. The state space of a household is
X = S × S × [a, a¯]. The transition matrix for s is denoted by Π. In the case of uncorrelated em-
ployment shocks within the household matrix Π is simply obtained as Π ≡ Πm⊗Πf . Otherwise, a
typical element of Π is written as pif
sf ′ |sf [(1− ς)pimsm′ |sm + ςI{sf ′=sm′}], where I is an indicator func-
tion and parameter ς ∈ [0, 1] pins down the extent of positive correlation in employment shocks
within the household. The vector of after-tax wages for the household, (wf , wm), is denoted by
w.
4Mazzocco (2007) uses CEX data to test, and reject, the hypothesis of intra-household commitment. Since our
model abstracts from permanent shocks and assumes only transitory shocks to labor income, we will initially retain,
for the sake of analytical tractability, the assumption of commitment. We discuss below the implications of this
assumption for our results.
5In a recent paper, Heathcote et al. (2009) endogenize the Pareto weight as the solution to a symmetric Nash
bargaining problem within the household.
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The maximization problem of a collective household with female’s Pareto weight µ(x, z) is
V (s, a;x, z, r) = max
cf ,cm,lf ,lm,a′
{
µ(x, z)Uf (cf , lf ) + [1− µ(x, z)]Um(cm, lm)
+β
∑
s′
pis′|sV (s′, a′;x, z, r)
}
(2.9)
s.t.
cf + cm + a′ =
∑
i=f,m
wi(1− li)si +
∑
i=f,m
(1− si)bi + (1 + r)a (2.10)
cf , cm ≥ 0, 0 ≤ lf , lm ≤ 1, and a′ ∈ [a, a¯], (2.11)
where pis′|s are the elements of Π. In our model, z is the only source of variation in Pareto
weights across households. We represent the distribution of these weights in the population of
households by G(µ), with support M ≡ (0, 1).
The utility function of the collective household depends, via the Pareto weight, on wages and policy
variables, yielding household demands that fail to meet the Slutsky conditions. This failure is the
defining feature of the collective model.6 Household decisions depend not only on total household
income, but also on who receives the income. The dependency of the household’s utility function
on prices and policy must be acknowledged when setting the Frisch elasticities of labor supply for
females and males. In particular, these elasticities are functions of the derivative of the Pareto
weight with respect to wages (see the Appendix for a derivation of Frisch elasticities). Likewise,
the household’s attitude towards risk depends both on individual preferences and on the Pareto
weight [a derivation of the household’s risk attitude under CRRA utility functions is presented in
the Appendix. For a two-period, collective model with uncertainty see Mazzocco (2004)].
The assumption of egoistical preferences is not crucial. Actually, Browning et al. (2006) show
that under caring preferences of the form U i(ci, li) + νiU j(cj , lj), where 0 < νi ≤ 1, is agent i’s
caring parameter, the utility function of the household can be written down as for the case of
egotistical preferences, after a re-definition of Pareto weights.
We now present the first-order conditions to the maximization problem (2.9)-(2.11). Risk-sharing
within the household implies that the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption equals relative
Pareto weights, and is thus independent of the realized vector of employment shocks. That is,
µUfc = (1− µ)Umc . (2.12)
This equation defines individual risk-sharing rules, which, for a given level of household consump-
tion, specify how much is consumed by each of its members. It is straightforward to show that
the first-order derivatives of the risk-sharing rules are positive and given by the product of the
6See Browning et al. (2006) for a formal definition of collective versus unitary models of the household.
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household’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion and the individual’s coefficient of absolute risk
tolerance.7 Therefore, the member of the household showing higher risk tolerance will be the one
absorbing most of the variation in total household consumption. (In the Appendix we present the
derivatives of the risk-sharing rules for the case of CRRA utility functions.)
First-order conditions to female and male labor supply are, respectively,
Ufl
Ufc
≥ wfsf with inequality if lf = 1 (2.13)
Uml
Umc
≥ wmsm with inequality if lm = 1. (2.14)
Moreover, if the labor supply decision is interior for both household members then
Ufl
wfsf
=
1− µ
µ
Uml
wmsm
. (2.15)
The first-order condition to savings is,
Ufc = β(1 + r)
∑
s′
pis′|s Uf ′c if a′ > a¯ (2.16)
Ufc ≥ β(1 + r)
∑
s′
pis′|s Uf ′c if a′ = a. (2.17)
Proposition 1 below presents some properties of the value function and decision rules for a house-
hold with Pareto weight µ ∈ M . (Our proof in the Appendix is for the case bf = bm = 0, but it
is straightforward to show that the results hold for the case of positive UI, provided wili ≥ bi for
i = f,m, i.e., earnings are higher than UI.)
Proposition 1. Assume A1 – A3, w > 0, (1 + r) > 0, β(1 + r) ≤ 1. Then:
(a) V (s, a, µ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in a. Decision rules cf (s, a;µ),
cm(s, a;µ), lf (s, a;µ), lm(s, a;µ) and a′(s, a;µ) are continuous in a and strictly positive.
(b) Decision rules for consumption, cf (s, a;µ) and cm(s, a;µ), are strictly increasing in a.
Decision rules for savings, a′(s, a;µ), and leisure, lf (sf = 1, sm, a;µ), lm(sm = 1, sf , a;µ),
are increasing in a.
(c) Decision rules for consumption are increasing in the own employment shock: cj(sj =
1, si, a;µ) ≥ cj(sj = 0, si, a;µ).
(d) Decision rules for leisure are increasing in the spouse’s employment shock: lj(sj = 1, si =
1, a) ≥ lj(sj = 1, si = 0, a;µ).
(e) If β(1 + r) ≤ 1, then for all a ∈ [a, a], a′(sf = 0, sm = 0, a;µ) ≤ a (with strict inequality
if a < a < a and β(1 + r) < 1).
7Risk tolerance is defined as the reciprocal of risk aversion.
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We now present some results on the asymptotic properties of the consumption program, savings
and labor supply of a household with Pareto weight µ, for different values of wages, (wf , wm),
and of the interest rate, r. We extend results by Marcet et al. (2007) for the bachelor household
to our two-person, collective household model. We also extend the results to non-homogeneous
utility functions. With this aim, let us denote by a˜(µ) the minimum level of asset holdings for
which both spouses within a household with Pareto weight µ will stop supplying labor. The value
of a˜(µ) and the proof of Proposition 2 below are presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 2: Assume A1 – A3, a > a˜(µ), w > 0 and (1 + r) > 0. Then:
(a) If β(1 + r) ≤ 1, for any a ≤ a˜(µ), a′(s, a;µ) ≤ a˜(µ).
(b) If β(1 + r) = 1, for any a ≥ a˜(µ) and any s we have a′(s, a;µ) = a, lf (s, a;µ) = 1,
lm(s, a;µ) = 1 and cf (s, a;µ) + cm(s, a;µ) = a r such that µUfc = (1− µ) Umc .
(c) If β(1 + r) = 1 and a ≤ a˜(µ), then at a.s.−→ a˜(µ), cit a.s.−→ c˜i(µ), lit a.s.−→ 1, i = f,m.
In the case β(1 + r) < 1, the household can reach any value of asset holdings from any initial
condition in finite time, and a stationary distribution arises in the long run. Moreover, in the
case β(1 + r) = 1 and a ≤ a˜(µ), capital accumulation in the long run is bounded and it converges
asymptotically to a˜(µ). This is in contrast to the case of inelastic labor supply where savings
asymptotically grow to infinity if β(1 + r) = 1. As it should be apparent from these results, the
endogenous labor-leisure decision changes the asymptotic behavior of consumption and wealth
by removing income uncertainty. That is, when household wealth is high enough, labor supply
equals zero and, thus, employment shocks no longer affect household income. Hence, under non-
stochastic income, unbounded asset accumulation is no longer optimal when β(1 + r) = 1.
If we set a > maxµ∈M a˜(µ) and choose initial capital holdings for all households with relative
Pareto weight µ such that a0(µ) ≤ a˜(µ), then the upper bound on asset holdings, which was
imposed to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the value function, is never binding.
2.2 The Steady-State Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium in the collective household economy is defined as follows. Let ψ(B;µ) be
a probability measure, defined on the Borel sigma algebra B, describing the mass of households
with fixed Pareto weight µ at each B ∈ B. Denote by P (s, a, B;µ) the probability that a household
with Pareto weight µ at state (s, a) will transit to a state that lies in B ∈ B in the next period.
The transition function P can be constructed as,
P (s, a, B;µ) =
∑
s′∈Bs
Πs′|s I{a′(s,a;µ)∈Ba},
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where I is an indicator function and Bs and Ba are the projections of B on S × S and [a, a],
respectively. We are now ready to define the stationary equilibrium.
Definition: A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets in the econ-
omy with collective households is a list of functions
{
V, cf , cm, lf , lm, a′,K, Lf , Lm
}
, a measure of
households ψ and a set of prices
{
r, w¯f , w¯m
}
, taxes
{
τ f , τm
}
and UI
{
bf , bm
}
such that:
1) For given prices, taxes and UI, V is the solution to (2.9) – (2.11), and cf (s, a;µ), cm(s, a;µ),
lf (s, a;µ), lm(s, a;µ) and a′(s, a;µ) are the associated optimal policy functions.
2) For given prices, K, Lf and Lm satisfy the firm’s first-order conditions (2.2) – (2.4).
3) Aggregate factor inputs are generated by the policy functions of the agents:
K =
∫
M
∫
X
a′(s, a;µ)dψdG, (2.18)
Lf =
∫
M
∫
X
sf [1− lf (s, a;µ)]dψdG, (2.19)
Lm =
∫
M
∫
X
sm[1− lm(s, a;µ)]dψdG. (2.20)
4) The time-invariant stationary distribution ψ is determined by the transition function P as
ψ(B;µ) =
∫
X
P (s, a, B;µ)dψ for all B ∈ B. (2.21)
5) The government budget is balanced: qf0 b
f + qm0 b
m = τ f w¯fLf + τmw¯mLm.
Under assumptions A1 – A3 the interest rate in the stationary equilibrium must be such that
β(1 + r) < 1.
2.3 Parameterization and Calibration
We assume identical preferences for females and males and parameterize their common instanta-
neous utility function as follows,8
U(c, l) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ + ϕ
l1−γ − 1
1− γ . (2.22)
Since our exercise is on intra-household insurance, and since insurance is tightly connected to
wealth, it is important that we match the proportion of low-wealth households in the U.S. Thus,
and following ideas in Krusell and Smith (1998), we assume that households are heterogeneous in
8In a previous version of this paper we assumed different preferences for females and males. Our main results
are however unaffected by this assumption.
10
terms of the discount factor, β. Namely, there is a fraction, say χ, of impatient households with
discount factor βL. Patient households use discount factor βH > βL.
The production technology is the standard Cobb-Douglas function, F (K,L) = KαL1−α, where
labor is L ≡ λLm + (1 − λ)Lf . Parameter α is the capital’s share of income and λ pins down
relative gross wages, since wf/wm = (1− λ)/λ.
We make the simplifying assumption of a degenerate distribution over vector z, implying a com-
mon relative Pareto weight across households. Both µ and its derivative with respect to x, µx(x, z),
are pinned down below.
Parameter Values We set values to five preference parameters: βL, βH , σ, ϕ, γ; three technology
parameters: α, λ and δ; and the four parameters in the two transition matrices Πf and Πm. The
public insurance program contains four parameters: τ f , τm, bf and bm. Finally, we have the
borrowing limit, a, and the two values µ and µx.
One period is set to one quarter. We choose a = 0 so that households face a no-borrowing
constraint. We set σ = 2, which is a standard value in the macro literature. The depreciation
rate of capital is set at δ = 0.025, and the capital’s share of income, α, equal to 0.36. We impose
equal tax rates for females and males, τ f = τm, which allows us to pin down the value of λ from
a priori information on the gender wage gap. We set λ equal to 0.575, corresponding to a wage
gap of 0.74, the value reported by Heathcote et al. (2010) for the 2004 U.S. economy.
Transition probabilities for idiosyncratic employment shocks are assumed to be identical for fe-
males and males, as the average difference between female and male unemployment rates over
the period 1980-2009 is practically zero. We set pii1|1 = 0.09 and pi
i
1|0 = 0.06 for i = f,m, which
match an average employment rate of 93%, after normalizing with the participation rate.9 In our
benchmark economy within-household employment shocks are uncorrelated, an assumption that
is supported by SIPP data (Survey of Income Program Participation). Indeed, within-household
unemployment correlation for households where husband and wife report different occupation is
0.05. For households reporting same occupation this correlation is 0.23. However, only 3.2% of
the households report same occupation for husband and wife. (For a detailed explanation on the
calculation of these correlations, see Shore and Sinai 2010.) We will study the sensitivity of our
results to positive correlation in employment shocks within the household.
Remaining parameters are set to match the following targets: 1) Married working females’ and
males’ average hours of work represent 28% and 40% of their discretionary time, respectively.10
9These transition probabilities are taken from Imrohoroglu (1989), Krusell and Smith (1998) and Marcet et al.
(2007).
10Mazzocco et al. (2008) use PSID data and obtain mean annual hours worked by working married females and
males equal to 1660 and 2312, respectively. We assume 16 hours of daily discretionary time.
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2) Estimates for males’ Frisch elasticity in the presence of borrowing constraints range from 0.2 to
0.6 (see Domeij and Flode´n 2006). For females, estimates are typically higher (see Blundell and
MaCurdy 1999). We will target values of 0.50 and 0.85 for males and females, respectively. 3)
The capital-to-output ratio is 10. 4) The average net UI replacement rate in the U.S. is roughly
30 percent (see OECD 2010). We set bf and bm to match this target as fractions of the average
wage income, both for females and males. Labor income tax rates are set to balance the budget
of the public insurance program. 5) The derivative of the Pareto weight function with respect to
the expected income differential, µx, is set to match sharing rule estimates presented in Browning
et al. (1994).11 6) The fraction of liquidity-constrained households in the U.S. (using Zeldes’ 1989
definition of liquidity constrained as holding non-housing wealth below two months of average
income) averages 17% for the period 1983-2004, as reported by Gorbachev and Dogra (2010). 7)
Finally, we target the ratio of wealth held by the bottom quintile in the wealth distribution over
total wealth to be less than one percent. Table 1 presents our benchmark economy.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Aggregate values at the steady-state equilibrium are: Y = 1.2722, K = 12.6814, L = 0.3490, and
r = 0.0111. This steady state matches relatively well the bottom tail of the wealth distribution,
but it does less well at matching the upper tail. We could improve on the upper tail by introducing
three different discount factors, as in Krusell and Smith (1998), instead of only two. However,
since our focus is on the effects of intra-household risk sharing at the level of the household, and
since these effects are small for households with high levels of wealth, it is not crucial that we
match the upper part of the wealth distribution. Hence, our model contains the structure needed
to conducting the study on intra-household risk sharing.
2.3.1 Policy Functions: A First Look at the Effects of Intra-household Risk Sharing
We start by presenting policy functions in our collective economy and then assess the effects of
intra-household risk sharing on households’ savings and hours worked. The left panel of Figure 1
presents savings policy functions (for convenience we plot the net change in asset holdings a′−a),
for households with low discount factor (top chart on left panel) and with high discount factor
(bottom chart on left panel). Among impatient households, positive net savings are observed
11These authors use data on couples with no children to estimate the parameters of the sharing rule: they find
that increasing the wife’s contribution to household income from 25% to 75% (holding total expenditure constant)
raises her share in total expenditure by about 2.3%. We use this estimate to obtain µx as follows. Starting from
the parameters that conform our benchmark economy, we increase the value of x — e.g. by raising wf/wm — and
then compute the new Pareto weight, say µ˜, such that the implied increase in the wife’s relative contribution to
household income yields an increase in the wife’s share of total expenditure, cf/(cf + cm), that matches the one
implied by the sharing rule as estimated in Browning et al. (1994).
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only when the two spouses are employed and hold low levels of assets. Households with one or
two unemployed spouses choose non-positive net savings. Among patient households, those with
two employed spouses choose positive net savings at all values in the support of the equilibrium
distribution of assets. Patient households where at least one of the spouses is unemployed choose
negative net savings at a large set of low asset holdings. Negative net savings are larger in
households where the male is unemployed.
Policy functions for hours are shown in the right panel of Figure 1 (top chart for impatient
households and bottom chart for patient ones). For both groups, hours decrease with household
wealth. As asset holdings approach the borrowing limit, policy functions for hours bend upwards,
capturing the fact that asset-poor households use labor supply to smooth consumption more
intensively. Hours increase if the spouse is unemployed, both for females and males, and the
increase is especially marked for females in asset-poor households. For example, a female in a
household with no assets will supply almost half of her available time to work if the spouse is
unemployed, as opposed to 0.36 when the spouse is employed, which represents a decline of 28%.
The savings and hours effects of intra-household risk sharing are shown in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2
plots excess savings of two bachelors (each with wealth a/2) over a two-person collective household
(with wealth a). The two top charts show excess savings for impatient and patient households
across employment shocks. Clearly, although risk sharing affects the savings decisions of all
households across the wealth distribution, its effects are strongest among wealth-poor households.
The bottom charts of Figure 2 show average excess savings.
The top chart of Figure 3 plots excess hours worked by two bachelors (each with wealth a/2)
over hours worked by a two-person collective household (with wealth a). (Since there is not much
difference in excess hours between patient and impatient households we plot the average of the
two.) For all households where only the male is employed, intra-household risk sharing increases
household hours. For households where the female is employed, with the exception of low-wealth
households with the male unemployed, intra-household risk sharing decreases household hours.
The bottom chart of the Figure shows the average of excess hours across households along the
employment distribution. As it is apparent, the effects of intra-household risk sharing on hours
are strongest among wealth-poor households.
3 Intra-household Risk Sharing and Public Insurance
The use of savings and labor supply as insurance mechanisms depends on the generosity of public
insurance. The extent to which the ability to share risks within the household shapes the crowding
out effects of public insurance is explored in this section.
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3.1 Household Financial Assets and the Generosity of UI
An implication of our model, as of any model with uninsurable income risk, is that household
asset holdings increase with income uncertainty. Since the level of UI is directly correlated with
household income risk, Engen and Gruber (2001) exploit the variation in generosity of unemploy-
ment insurance schedules across U.S. states to test this implication and to estimate the extent
of the precautionary savings motive. These authors use SIPP data —which follows a cross sec-
tion of households over a period of 2.5 years— in combination with data on UI available to
these households under their state/date insurance system. They regress household financial as-
sets (normalized by average household income) on the generosity of UI, controlling for a vector of
demographic and economic characteristics of the household. They find an elasticity of the average
household’s financial assets-to-income ratio with respect to UI equal to −0.28. That is, reducing
the replacement rate of UI by 50% would increase the household’s assets-to-income ratio by 14%.
We use our model economy to compute the elasticity of the average assets-to-income ratio with
respect to UI. The purpose of this exercise is twofold. On the one hand, we use it as a test for
our model to match this estimated measure of the precautionary savings motive. On the other
hand, we also compute this elasticity using the bachelor household model and assess by how much
it overestimates the precautionary motive. In this latter model there is no intra-household risk
sharing and, therefore, variation in UI amounts to larger changes in household income risk and,
consequently, to larger effects on savings.
In order to mimic the empirical exercise conducted by Engen and Gruber (2001) we proceed as
follows. Since these authors rely on the exogenous variation in UI for workers living in different
states in the U.S., we interpret the level of UI in our benchmark economy as the average value
across all states. Then, we vary the level and compute asset-to-income ratios holding equilibrium
prices unchanged, a strategy in accordance with the existence of a unique financial and labor
market across states. However, Pareto weights and the distribution of households over asset
holdings are let to change with UI. Thus, our exercise compares the differential asset-to-income
ratio of households across states that provide these households with differing levels of UI, which
is exactly what Engen and Gruber (2001) do in their empirical work. The results of this exercise
are presented in Table 2. Our collective household model yields an elasticity of the assets-to-
income ratio with respect to UI equal to −0.38, accounting thus fairly well for the empirical
elasticity estimated by Engen and Gruber (2001). On the contrary, the bachelor household model
overpredicts this elasticity by a factor of more than two. This shows that intra-household risk
sharing plays a crucial role in the determination of the elasticity of the assets-to-income ratio and,
therefore, that this informal source of insurance is key when assessing the crowding out effects of
public insurance.
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The relative success of our collective model at matching this empirical elasticity lends support to
the view that the two-person household embeds the most relevant informal insurance arrangements
available to individuals. Indeed, some authors have emphasized that the extended family, friends
and other social networks play only a negligible insurance role (see, e.g., Blundell et al. 2008).
[Insert Table 2 here]
The results in this section are robust to the introduction of correlated employment shocks within
the household. The elasticity of the assets-to-income ratio with respect to UI in the collective
economy increases only to −0.39 when the correlation in employment shocks is set to 0.3.
3.2 Spousal Labor Supply as Insurance
As shown above, spousal labor supply is a potentially important source of household self-insurance.
The change in a household member’s labor supply induced by an unemployment spell of another
household member —the added worker effect— has been largely studied in the empirical litera-
ture. Most of this literature has focused on the labor supply response of married women to their
husband’s unemployment spells.12
Early literature on the added worker effect (see Cullen and Gruber 2000 for a short review) has
singled out liquidity constraints as one of the main reasons married women increase hours worked
during their husband’s unemployment spells. Empirical estimates have, however, produced mixed
results, failing to find strong support for this effect.13 Cullen and Gruber (2000), using SIPP data
for married couples aged between 25 and 54 years old, report means for wives’ monthly hours
worked during husbands’ spells of employment and unemployment, respectively. Conditional on
working women, these authors find that the average amount of work per month by wives of
unemployed husbands is 149 hours, as opposed to 132.4 by wives of employed husbands. When
non-working wives are included, average hours are 98.2 and 97.9, respectively.
In this section we use our collective households model to study the response of female labor
supply to males’ unemployment spells in two groups of households. In order to highlight the role
of liquidity constraints for wives’ labor supply responses, we follow Zeldes (1989) in defining a
household as liquidity constrained if its non-housing wealth is less than two months of average
income. Table 3 below reports the added worker effect in our model economy. For the group
12The main argument in favor of restricting the attention to labor supply of women is that they are the secondary
wage earners in most households (according to Cullen and Gruber 2000, in 87% of married couples in the U.S. the
husband earns more and in 73% the husband works more hours).
13Stephens (2002) estimates the added worker effect taking into account not only the current period of the
husband’s job loss but also the periods before and after a job loss. This author finds small pre-displacement effects
but large, persistent post-displacement effects.
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of liquidity-constrained households, average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are
8.6% higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands, an increase comparable to that
found by Cullen and Gruber (2000) in their sample of working women. When all households
are taken into account the increase in hours is only 2.7%. That is, spousal labor supply is an
important insurance mechanism for wealth-poor households but not for the wealth rich.
[Insert Table 3 here]
How effective is wives’ labor supply as insurance against income fluctuations due to husbands’
unemployment? To answer this question we compute, for each level of assets, a, the fraction of
lost family income that is made up by the wife’s response to the husband’s unemployment spell,
[hf (0, 1, a)− hf (1, 1, a)]wf
hm(1, 1, a)wm − bm ,
where hf (0, 1, a) denotes hours worked by a female with an unemployed husband and hf (1, 1, a)
is female hours if the husband is employed. The denominator represents lost income due to
husband’s unemployment. The numerator is the increase in income due to the wife’s response in
hours. For the group of liquidity-constrained households, the wives’ response makes up about 9.6%
of lost family income, while this number is only 2.5% when we consider all households. Wealth-
rich households use savings to smooth consumption upon husband’s unemployment. Liquidity-
constrained households must rely, however, on spousal labor supply.
Spousal Labor Supply and the Generosity of UI According to some authors, the moderate
to nil added worker effect found in the data may be partially explained by the presence of public
insurance. That is, unemployment payments during the husband’s unemployment spell crowd out
wife’s labor supply. Cullen and Gruber (2000) estimate this effect and find that a 50% reduction in
potential UI of the husband (75 USD per week) would imply an increase in monthly hours worked
by the wife (conditional on working) of 13.42 hours, which amounts to an increase of about 9%.
They also find a differentially larger response of wives’ labor supply among liquidity-constrained
households.
We use our model economy to compute the crowding out of UI on wives’ labor supply. Table
4 below presents the results of this exercise. A 50% reduction in UI received by the husband
increases wife’s hours by 8.71% in the group of liquidity-constrained households. This increase is
only 1.53% when all households are considered. The relatively higher sensitivity of spousal labor
supply to UI among liquidity-constrained households found in our model in is line with the finding
of Cullen and Gruber (2000).
[Insert Table 4 here]
Even though a direct comparison of our results with those in Cullen and Gruber (2000) is not
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straightforward, our findings in Table 6 are remarkably close to empirical estimates. It should be
noted, however, that their estimated increase in hours of work by the wife after a 50% reduction
in UI received by the unemployed husband is not statistically significant, thus hindering the
assessment of our model’s predictions.
3.3 Consumption Loss Upon Unemployment
Under imperfect capital markets, the loss of the job implies a reduction in the level of individual
consumption. The degree of transmission of unemployment shocks to consumption depends on
factors such as the generosity of UI, on the level of accumulated wealth and on whether risks are
shared within the household.
In this section we use our benchmark economy to assess the contribution of intra-household
risk sharing to individual consumption insurance, as measured by the degree of transmission of
unemployment shocks to consumption. We do so by comparing individual consumption losses upon
unemployment in the collective household model to those in the bachelor model. We compute the
percentage change in consumption upon unemployment, 4c/c, at all asset levels in the support
of the corresponding equilibrium distribution. In the collective economy, individual consumption
losses for females and males, both with an employed spouse and with an unemployed spouse, are
computed as,
cj(sj = 0, si, a)− cj(sj = 1, si, a)
cj(sj = 1, si, a)
,
for j = f,m, i = f,m and i 6= j, both for si = 1 and si = 0. For the bachelor economy, individual
consumption losses upon unemployment are computed as, (cj(0, a)−cj(1, a))/cj(1, a) for j = f,m.
In panel (a) of Table 5 we report average individual consumption losses, both for the group
of liquidity-constrained individuals and for all individuals. We use the respective equilibrium
asset and employment distributions to average out individual consumption losses. The results
show that intra-household risk sharing provides important consumption smoothing opportunities,
especially for liquidity-constrained individuals. Thus, the average consumption loss for a liquidity-
constrained female in the bachelor economy is −23.23%, against −4.5% in the collective economy.
For a liquidity-constrained male, intra-household risk sharing reduces his consumption loss from
−30.09% to −8.74%. These numbers imply that the family is an important provider of consump-
tion insurance for a significant fraction of individuals. These results are robust to correlation in
employment shocks within the household. For instance, a correlation of 0.3 implies consumption
losses of −4.85% and −9.05% for liquidity-constrained females and males, respectively.
[Insert Table 5 here]
We also study household insurance by computing the fraction of household income loss (due
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to an unemployment shock) that translates into household consumption loss. To do this we
compute income and consumption losses upon an unemployment shock for each household across
the asset and employment distributions. Then, we average out the percentage of income loss that
is transmitted to consumption loss across all households. Panel (b) of Table 5 presents our results
for the two household arrangements.
The fraction of income loss that transits to consumption loss in the group of liquidity-constrained
households is non-negligible, even in the collective household economy. For an average household
in this group, 17.31% of the household income lost due to an unemployment shock is absorbed by
consumption. This result is consistent with the empirical finding of Blundell et al. (2008) about
the degree of insurability of transitory income shocks. They find that the impact of these shocks
on consumption is small when estimated from all households in their sample, but it is found to be
larger, about 0.2, in the subsample of wealth-poor households (these authors define a household
as wealth poor if its wealth is in the bottom 20 percent of the distribution of initial wealth).
The fraction of income loss that transmits to consumption loss under a 0.3 correlation of em-
ployment shocks within the household increases from 17.31% to 18.39% for liquidity-constrained
households.
Consumption Loss and the Generosity of UI We now turn to the sensitivity of house-
hold consumption losses upon unemployment with respect to the generosity of UI. Browning and
Crossley (2001), using a Canadian panel, estimate this sensitivity exploiting legislative changes
introduced in 1993 and 1994 that reduced the replacement rate by about five percentage points.
In total, 19, 000 individuals who had experienced a job separation either before or after the policy
reform were interviewed several times after the job loss. Browning and Crossley (2001) obtain
two main results. First, the level of UI has small average effects on household consumption loss
upon unemployment. In particular, a 10 percentage-point reduction in UI leads to an average
fall in consumption of 0.8%.14 Second, the consumption effects of UI are not homogeneous across
households, being substantially larger within the group of liquidity-constrained households at the
time of job separation. (These authors also follow Zeldes’ (1989) definition of liquidity-constrained
households.) These results show the importance of UI as a consumption smoothing instrument
for wealth-poor households.
Table 6 below presents the elasticities of consumption loss with respect to UI in our model
economies with and without intra-household risk sharing. Our quantitative exercise explicitly
acknowledges the panel dimension of the empirical exercise conducted by Browning and Crossley
(2001). We compute the relative change in consumption from the period prior to the unemploy-
14Gruber (1997) uses U.S. data on food consumption from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
finds a larger mean effect of UI on consumption losses upon unemployment. This author estimates that a 10
percentage-point increase in UI reduces the fall in consumption by 2.65%.
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ment shock to the period in which the job separation is realized. Saving decisions in the pre-
unemployment period are used for the computation of consumption upon unemployment. That
is, consumption of an individual of gender j in the period before unemployment is cj(sj = 1, si, a)
and consumption at the time of the job loss is cj(sj = 0, si, a′), where a′ = a′(sj = 1, si, a). We
then weigh consumption levels in both periods using the stationary distribution of employment
shocks for the spouse (in the collective economy). Our collective economy accounts well for the
elasticity of consumption loss with respect to UI in the group of liquidity-constrained households.
It however underestimates this elasticity for the whole sample of households.
[Insert Table 6 here]
It is important to note that the empirical exercise in Browning and Crossley (2001) uses Canadian
data, while our baseline parameter values have been chosen to match U.S. stylized facts. Then,
rather than trying to account for this elasticity, our exercise in this section aims at shedding
further light on the role of intra-household risk sharing. Thus, the elasticity predicted by the
bachelor economy, −0.2262, is more than two times the elasticity under collective households.
4 Applications and Extensions
The Value of Intra-household Risk Sharing In order to assess the value of intra-household
insurance, we first remove from our benchmark economy all intra-household transfers which are
not related to risk sharing. This is accomplished by setting the gender wage gap to zero and
the relative Pareto weight to one, so that any transfer within the household is driven by risk
pooling. We then compute the increase in bachelor consumption that would leave an individual
in a collective household indifferent between remaining in the household and splitting up with
half of the household’s assets to remain bachelor thereafter. I.e., we compute the value of ζ that
solves,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU i(ccolt , l
col
t ) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU i((1 + ζ)cbacht , l
bach
t ), (4.1)
where a superscript col refers to allocations in the collective economy from initial conditions (si, sj)
and a0, and a superscript bach refers to allocations attained by the deviating individual from initial
conditions si and a0/2. The results vary widely depending upon own and spouse’s employment
status, discount factor and asset holdings. For instance, the value of intra-household insurance for
an impatient, unemployed individual with an employed spouse and no assets represents 5.16% of
per period consumption of a similar bachelor individual. This number goes down to 0.75% if the
individual is employed. The value of intra-household insurance for the unemployed decreases if the
spouse is also unemployed. Also, the value of family insurance is lower to patient than to impatient
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individuals. When aggregating over employment shocks and discount factors, the welfare gain
within the group of liquidity-constrained households averages 0.2387%. To conclude, our model
suggests that the value of intra-household insurance is significant to wealth-poor, unemployed
individuals and that it decreases with wealth, especially among patient households. Finally, note
that the value of family insurance to unemployed individuals with no assets is higher than the
average value of removing aggregate business cycle fluctuations, as estimated in the literature.
Optimal Unemployment Insurance We carry out two exercises to ascertain how access to
insurance from the family shapes the welfare effects of UI, and how it affects the optimal provision
of public insurance. As noted by Krusell et al. (2010), measuring the welfare effects of UI by
comparing ex ante, average utilities may be misleading, and they advocate instead for looking at
welfare effects for different groups of agents. We follow this line and compute optimal UI, and the
welfare effects of changes in UI, for the average household with wealth level a.
Our first results show that family insurance is a key determinant of optimal public insurance,
especially for wealth-poor households. The optimal replacement rate for an average collective
household with no assets is about 15%, while this rate increases to 60% for the average bachelor
household with no assets, i.e., a difference of 45 percentage points. If the look now at households
with levels of wealth equal to two months of average income, the differential in optimal replacement
rates for the collective and the bachelor household goes down to 30 percentage points. As was to
be expected, the higher the wealth level, the lower the differential in optimal replacement rates
implied by family insurance. Actually, at wealth levels equal to six months of average income,
this differential becomes zero.
Second, we compute the welfare effects (in consumption equivalent units) of reducing the re-
placement rate by 10 percentage points from the value in our baseline economy. For the average
collective households with no assets this decrease in UI amounts to an increase in welfare of
0.015%, while the average bachelor households experiences a decrease in welfare of −0.164%.
Among the group of liquidity-constrained households, the reduction in UI increases welfare of
collective households by 0.034%, and decreases welfare of bachelor households by −0.035%.
Marital Shocks As shown by Mazzocco (2007), the assumption of commitment might not be
supported by empirical evidence. In general, lack of commitment leads to non-stationary Pareto
weights and, in certain cases, to marriage dissolution. In order to understand how the possibility
of marriage dissolution alters the saving behavior of our two-person, collective households, we
now introduce exogenous marital shocks into our benchmark economy. It must be noted that this
extension does not embody all the implications of lack of commitment, but it does include the
most relevant one to our purposes, i.e., the end of the marriage and hence of family insurance.
Marital risk is bound to affect household savings, consumption and labor supplies, and thus the
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role played by intra-household insurance.
Two-person households face now an exogenous probability of dissolution, say φd > 0. When the
separation shock hits, household members become single, each with half of the household assets.
We assume no divorce costs. Single individuals face a probability of being matched with another
single of opposite gender, say φm > 0, and form a two-person household. Matching is segmented
in the sense that prospective spouses for a single agent with wealth a are assumed to have wealth
in a neighborhood centered around a. Upon matching, a two-person household is immediately
formed and all assets are shared.15 We choose φd so that half of the population lives as married
couples (according to the 2001 U.S. census, 54.8% and 44% of men and women over 25 years of
age were married, respectively) and that the average duration of marriage is 7 years. Note that
in our dynastic model if 50 percent of the population lives as married households we must have
that φd = φm.
We now assess the effects of risk of divorce on savings, on the extent of the precautionary motive
and on consumption losses. The savings effects of marital risk have received some attention in
the literature. An important research question in this literature is whether an increase in the
risk of marriage dissolution leads to higher household savings.16 The exercise we conduct in this
section consists in computing the change in savings that would follow from the removal of marital
risk, both for liquidity-constrained households and for all households in the economy. That is,
we start with φd = 0.024 and then set this probability to zero. We find that savings go down by
4.2584% within the group of liquidity-constrained households, and 0.0292% when all households
are considered. The removal of marital risk eliminates a need for precautionary savings and,
therefore, decreases households savings. This result is consistent with the findings in Gonza´lez
and O¨zcan (2008).
We now compute the elasticity of the assets-to-income ratio with respect to UI in this economy
with marital risk, which is a measure of the precautionary motive. This elasticity is −0.48, against
the −0.38 we found under no marital risk. As expected, the extra risk brought about by marital
shocks increases the responsiveness of household asset holdings to changes in UI.
Our final exercise computes consumption losses upon unemployment and/or divorce shocks. That
is, we take an agent who is married and employed in period t − 1, and who transits to period t
either as: (i) married and unemployed, (ii) single and employed, or (iii) single and unemployed.
We compute the average loss in consumption of this generic agent within the group of liquidity-
15Even though different divorce rules and/or an endogenous marriage decision may have important quantitative
effects, we believe our model provides a useful benchmark to assessing the effects of marital transitions.
16See Gonza´lez and O¨zcan (2008) for a recent empirical study using the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996.
They find results suggesting that the risk of divorce brought about by the law was followed by an increase in the
propensity to save of married couples.
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constrained households. The consumption loss upon the unemployment shock, (i), is −6.42%. The
marriage shock, (ii), implies a loss of consumption of −2.13%, and a combined unemployment and
marriage shock, (iii), brings about a loss of consumption of −34.32%. In our framework without
public goods within the household and without divorce costs, the unemployment shock has larger
consumption effects than a marriage shock. The two shocks combined amplify consumption losses.
Three remarks concerning the scope of this version of the model, where married and single house-
holds co-exist, are in order. First, as indicated above, an implication of limited commitment is
non stationarity in Pareto weights, a feature our model is silent about. It is conceivable that upon
being hit by the unemployment shock, an agent sees her(his) Pareto weight reduced in favor of
his (her) employed spouse. This shift towards the employed spouse may weaken the savings and
labor supply effects of intra-household insurance, especially among low-wealth households. Sec-
ond, if we interpret cohabitation as a form of marriage without family insurance, and assume that
singles in our model are cohabiting couples (i.e., two singles under the same roof), then our model
accounts for the differential in savings between cohabiting and married couples observed in the
U.S. Negrasa and Oreffice (2010) use the 2000 U.S. Census and show that cohabiting heterosexual
couples save more than their married counterparts. The explanation for this differential provided
by our model is higher precautionary savings. Third, if we interpret singles in our model as non-
cohabiting adults, then our model cannot account for the higher savings rate of married versus
single households. The explanation of this failure is that our model abstracts from important
drivers of household savings. Two such omissions are life-cycle considerations and households’
housing investment.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we assess quantitatively the effects of intra-household risk sharing on savings and
labor supply within a model of idiosyncratic unemployment risk. With this purpose, we present a
model economy where households are formed by a female and a male, who make collective decisions
and lack access to a complete capital market. Our model is a dynamic version of the standard
collective model of the household developed by Chiappori and co-authors since the 1980’s, which
assumes efficient risk sharing within the household. Equipped with this model, we then ask about
the quantitative effects of this informal insurance arrangement on households’ savings and labor
supplies, on the extent of the precautionary motive, on the crowding out effects of public insurance
and on consumption losses upon unemployment. In light of our results, we conclude that intra-
household risk sharing has large quantitative effects on all these margins explored. Importantly,
we find that our model economy accounts relatively well for key elasticities of savings and spousal
labor supply with respect to UI, as estimated by Engen and Gruber (2001) and Cullen and Gruber
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(2000), respectively. We also show that standard models, which abstract from intra-household
risk sharing, fail to match those elasticities. A conclusion we draw from the exercise in this paper
is that ignoring risk sharing at the level of the household introduces an important bias not only
on the extent of the precautionary motive but also on the distortionary effects of public insurance
programs.
The model presented in this paper can be used to address a number of related questions. In
particular, we plan to use versions of this model to shed further light on a recent debate about
gender-based taxation. A number of scholars have argued in favor of taxing females and males
differently on the grounds of their different elasticities of labor supply. The interplay of income
tax rates with Pareto weights within the household is bound to introduce tradeoffs that have
been so far overlooked in this debate. An important extension that is worth pursuing is the
consideration of permanent income shocks under no commitment to future household allocations.
As mentioned above, under no commitment Pareto weights are non stationary, a feature that is
likely to affect the role played by intra-household risk sharing. Finally, in light of recent results
on the degree of household insurability against different types of shocks and the evolution of
consumption and income inequality (see, e.g., Blundell et al. 2008), we need models that can
account for the observed ability of households to insure different kinds of risks. Models with two-
person households and perfect risk sharing within the household are a first step in this direction.
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APPENDIX (not for publication)
This document contains proofs and derivations of results discussed in the paper “How Important is
Intra-household Risk Sharing for Savings and Labor Supply?,” by Salvador Ortigueira and Nawid
Siassi.
I. Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) The proof of this part follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem and Theorem 3 and
Corollary 2 in Denardo (1967).
(b) Case 1: We consider first values of a such that a′(s, a) > a (interior solution).
(i) cf (s, a), cm(s, a) are strictly increasing in a. Take the envelope condition (using A2):
Va(s, a;µ) = µU
f
c (c
f (s, a), ·)(1 + r) = (1− µ)Umc (cm(s, a), ·)(1 + r). (I.1)
Since V (s, a, µ) is strictly concave, Va(s, a;µ) is strictly decreasing in a. It follows that
U ic(c
i(s, a;µ), ·), i = f,m, must be strictly decreasing in a as well. Since U i is strictly
concave in ci, the result follows.
(ii) a′(s, a) increasing in a. By contradiction: suppose there were values a1, a2 such that a2 > a1
and a′(s, a2) < a′(s, a1). Then since cf (s, a) is strictly increasing in a (as shown before),
it has to be that cf (s, a′(s, a2)) < cf (s, a′(s, a1)). As utility is separable and the marginal
utility of consumption does not depend on the level of leisure, the following holds:
β(1 + r)E
[
Ufc (c
f (s′, a′(s, a2)), ·)
]
> β(1 + r)E
[
Ufc (c
f (s′, a′(s, a1)), ·)
]
.
However, the Euler equation then implies Ufc (cf (s, a2), ·) > Ufc (cf (s, a1), ·), which is a con-
tradiction because cf (s, a2) > c
f (s, a1).
(iii) lf (sf = 1, sm, a) and lm(sm = 1, sf , a) increasing in a. Intratemporal optimality requires:
U il
U ic
≥ wisi, for i = f,m, (I.2)
with inequality if li = 1. Since ci(s, a) is strictly increasing in a, U ic(c
i(s, a), ·) is strictly
decreasing in a. Hence, U il (·, li(si = 1, sj , a)) has to be decreasing in a, too. This implies
that li(si = 1, sj , a) is increasing in a.
Case 2: Consider now values of a such that a′(s, a) = a (non-interior solution). In this case the
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budget constraint reads
cf (s, a) + cm(s, a) = wf (1− lf (s, a))sf + wm(1− lm(s, a))sm + (1 + r)a− a. (I.3)
The proof is by contradiction:
(i) Suppose that lf (s, a) is decreasing in a and lm(s, a) is increasing in a. From intratemporal
optimality (I.2) it follows that cf (s, a) must be decreasing in a and that cm(s, a) must be
increasing in a. This is a contradiction with the first-order condition defining risk-sharing
rules, i.e., equation (2.12) in the paper.
(ii) Suppose that lf (s, a) is increasing in a and lm(s, a) is decreasing in a. From intratemporal
optimality (I.2) it follows that cf (s, a) must be increasing in a and that cm(s, a) must be
decreasing in a. This is a contradiction with (2.12).
(iii) Suppose that lf (s, a) and lm(s, a) are decreasing in a. From intratemporal optimality (I.2)
it follows that cf (s, a) and cm(s, a) must be decreasing in a. This is a contradiction with
(I.3).
Hence, lf (s, a) and lm(s, a) are increasing in a, and (I.3) implies that cf and cm are strictly
increasing in a.
(c) Case 1: Consider values of a such that a′(s, a) > a (interior solution).
As in the proof of Lemma 1 in Huggett (1993), it can be shown by induction that Va(s
j = 1, si, a) ≤
Va(s
j = 0, si, a), ∀si, using the assumption that pii1|1 ≥ pii1|0. The result then follows immediately
from the envelope condition (I.1).
Case 2: We consider now values of a such that a′(s, a) = a (non-interior solution).
First we show that cj(sj = 1, si = 0, a) ≥ cj(sj = 0, si = 0, a). Evaluating the budget constraint
at these two household’s employment shocks we obtain,
cj(sj = 1, si = 0, a) + ci(sj = 1, si = 0, a) + a− (1 + r)a− wj(1− lj(sj = 1, si = 0, a)) = 0
cj(sj = 0, si = 0, a) + ci(sj = 0, si = 0, a) + a− (1 + r)a = 0. (I.4)
This implies that cj(sj = 1, si = 0, a) + ci(sj = 1, si = 0, a) ≥ cj(sj = 0, si = 0, a) + ci(sj = 0, si =
0, a). The result follows from the first-order condition for consumption, (2.12).
We now show that cj(sj = 1, si = 1, a) ≥ cj(sj = 0, si = 1, a). Using the budget constraint and
eliminating terms we get,
cj(sj = si = 1, a) + ci(sj = si = 1, a)− wi(1− li(sj = si = 1, a))− wj(1− lj(sj = si = 1, a))
= cj(sj = 0, si = 1, a) + ci(sj = 0, si = 1, a)− wi(1− li(sj = 0, si = 1, a)). (I.5)
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Suppose, towards a contradiction, that ci(sj = 1, si = 1, a) < ci(sj = 0, si = 1, a). Intratemporal
optimality (I.2) then requires li(sj = 0, si = 1, a) > li(sj = 1, si = 1, a), and (2.12) implies
cj(sj = 1, si = 1, a) < cj(sj = 0, si = 1, a). Hence, the right hand side of equation (I.5) is strictly
larger than the first three terms on the left hand side, which immediately leads to a contradiction.
(d) Start from cj(sj = 1, si, a) ≥ cj(sj = 0, si, a),∀a. Then (2.12) implies that ci(sj = 1, si, a) ≥
ci(sj = 0, si, a). The result follows immediately from equations (2.13) and (2.14).
(e) By contradiction: suppose there is an a ∈ [a, a] such that a′(sf = 0, sm = 0, a) > a and
U ic(c
i(sf = 0, sm = 0, a), ·) = β(1 + r)E
[
U ic(c
i(s′, a′(sf = 0, sm = 0, a)), ·)
]
, i = f,m.
(The equality follows from a′(sf = 0, sm = 0, a) > a ≥ a.) Since (i) β(1 + r) ≤ 1, (ii) ci(s, a)
strictly increasing in a and (iii) ci(s, a) is time-invariant if factor prices are constant, it follows
that:
β(1 + r)E
[
U ic(c
i(s′, a′(sf = 0, sm = 0, a)), ·)
]
≤ E [U ic(ci(s′, a), ·)] .
Combining these two expressions implies that
U ic(c
i(sf = 0, sm = 0, a), ·) ≤ E [U ic(ci(s′, a), ·)] .
Using part (c) this can only hold if ci(s, a) is the same for all s ∈ S × S and, consequently,
a′(s, a) > a for all s. Since consumption is strictly increasing in a, this implies that future
consumption will be strictly higher in any state s′ and, hence,
U ic(c
i(s, a), ·) > E [U ic(ci(s′, a′(s, a)), ·)] .
The Euler equation, however, requires
U ic(c
i(s, a), ·) = β(1 + r)E [U ic(ci(s′, a′(s, a)), ·)] ,
which is impossible for β(1 + r) ≤ 1.
Strict inequality: suppose there is an a ∈ (a, a) such that a′(sf = 0, sm = 0, a) = a. Using part (c)
it follows that a′(s, a) ≥ a for all s. Since consumption is strictly increasing in a, this implies that
future consumption will be at least as high as current consumption in any state s′ and, hence,
U ic(c
i(sf = 0, sm = 0, a), ·) ≥ E
[
U ic(c
i(s′, a′(sf = 0, sm = 0, , a)), ·)
]
.
The Euler equation, however, requires
U ic(c
i(sf = 0, sm =, a), ·) = β(1 + r)E
[
U ic(c
i(s′, a′(sf = 0, sm = 0, a)), ·)
]
,
(the equality follows from a′(sf = 0, sm = 0, a) = a > a). This is impossible for β(1 + r) < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2:
First we pin down the value of a˜(µ). Since utility is separable in consumption and leisure, we can
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plug (2.12) into (2.14) and thus rewrite the first-order conditions to female and male labor supply
as
Ufc s
f ≤U
f
l
wf
with inequality if lf = 1 (I.6)
Ufc s
m ≤U
m
l
wm
1− µ
µ
with inequality if lm = 1. (I.7)
Define U˜ il as the marginal utility of leisure for individual i = f,m, at l
i = 1. Also, define
U˜fc (µ) ≡ min
{
U˜fl
wf
,
U˜ml
wm
1− µ
µ
}
(I.8)
and U˜mc (µ) ≡ µ1−µ U˜fc (µ). Let c˜i(µ) be the level of consumption for which the corresponding
marginal utility of consumption equals U˜ ic(µ). Then the level of asset holding a˜(µ) mentioned
above is defined as
a˜(µ) ≡ 1
r
[
c˜f (µ) + c˜m(µ)
]
. (I.9)
It can easily be checked that at a˜(µ), equations (2.10) – (2.14) are satisfied for all possible real-
izations of sf and sm if consumption levels equal c˜f (µ) and c˜m(µ), hours worked equal zero and
asset holdings remain constant. In the case that β(1 + r) = 1, equation (2.16) is satisfied, because
consumption is constant. Hence, if β(1 + r) = 1, optimal decision rules are
ci(s, a˜(µ);µ) =c˜i(µ) (I.10)
li(s, a˜(µ);µ) =1 (I.11)
a′(s, a˜(µ);µ) =a˜(µ), (I.12)
for i = f,m and for all s ∈ S × S. Thus, if the household ever reaches a˜(µ), it will maintain a
constant consumption stream without ever working. For lower interest rates, constant consump-
tion does not satisfy the FOC for asset holdings, and the household never reaches a˜(µ). We can
now prove the Proposition.
In order to compact notation, we will write a˜(µ) simply as a˜.
(a) Let us first assume r > 0. We prove that a′(s, a˜) ≤ a˜. The result then follows from the fact
that a′(s, a) is increasing in a, as shown before. From part (c) of Proposition 1, a′(sf = 0, sm =
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0, a˜) ≤ a˜. Then using the budget constraint:
a′(sf = 0, sm = 0, a˜) ≤a˜ (I.13)
wf ·
(
1− lf (sf = 0, sm = 0, a˜)
)
· 0 + wm ·
(
1− lm(sf = 0, sm = 0, a˜)
)
· 0+
+(1 + r)a˜− cf (sf = 0, sm = 0, a˜)− cm(sf = 0, sm = 0, a˜) ≤a˜ (I.14)
cf (sf = 0, sm = 0, a˜) + cm(sf = 0, sm = 0, a˜) ≥ra˜. (I.15)
From before we know that decision rules for consumption are increasing in endowments; hence,
cf (s, a˜) + cm(s, a˜) ≥ ra˜ , ∀s.
Finally, use the definition of a˜ from above and the FOC with respect to leisure to get
lf (s, a˜) = lm(s, a˜) = 1 , ∀s.
Hence, a′(s, a˜) ≤ a˜.
Case r ≤ 0: Take a1 < a2 and thus cf (s, a1)+cm(s, a1) < cf (s, a2)+cm(s, a2). Plug in the budget
constraints:
wf (1− lf (s, a1))sf + wm(1− lm(s, a1))sm + (1 + r)a1 − a′(s, a1) <
wf (1− lf (s, a2))sf + wm(1− lm(s, a2))sm + (1 + r)a2 − a′(s, a2) (I.16)
and thus
a′(s, a2)− a′(s, a1) < (1 + r)(a2 − a1) +wf (lf (s, a1)− lf (s, a2))sf +wm(lm(s, a1)− lf (s, a2))sm.
Divide by a2 − a1:
a′(s, a2)− a′(s, a1)
a2 − a1 < (1 + r) +
1
a2 − a1
[
wf (lf (s, a1)− lf (s, a2))sf +wm(lm(s, a1)− lf (s, a2))sm
]
.
Since leisure is increasing in a, the last two terms are non-positive. Also, r is non-positive by
assumption. Therefore,
a′(s, a2)− a′(s, a1)
a2 − a1 < 1.
That is, the decision rule for capital accumulation has a slope that is strictly lower than 1 and
strictly positive. This implies that for all s there is a level of asset holdings a˜(s) (this is not the
same a˜ as above!) such that a′(s, a˜) ≤ a˜, i.e. a′ crosses the 45 degree line at most once.
(b) Take an arbitrary level of asset holdings a0 ≥ a˜ and check whether the proposed allocation{
ĉf , ĉm, l̂f , l̂m, â′
}
satisfies first-order optimality:
• equation (2.12) is satisfied by definition
• ĉf + ĉm = a r ≥ a˜ r = c˜f + c˜m; moreover, ĉi ≥ c˜i =⇒ Û ic ≤ U˜ ic, i = f,m, which implies by
(I.8) that equations (2.13) and (2.14) are satisfied
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• the budget constraint (2.10) holds and
• the Euler equation (2.16) holds because consumption is constant.
Since the problem is concave, first-order optimality is sufficient for an optimum. Since the policy
functions characterize the optimum, the proposed allocation is optimal.
(c) The proof exploits results in Chamberlain and Wilson (2000), which are also used in Marcet,
Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007). Part (a) implies that at ≤ a˜(µ), ∀t, and part (b) of Proposition
1 together with part (b) of Proposition 2 imply that cit ≤ c˜i(µ), i = f,m, so that individual
consumption levels are bounded almost surely. The first-order condition to savings (2.16) and
(2.17) imply that U ic,t ≥ Et(U ic,t+1) almost surely, so that U ic,t is a super-martingale. As U ic,t
is bounded from below by U ic
(
c˜i(µ)
)
, we can apply the martingale convergence theorem, which
implies that U ic,t converges almost surely to a random variable. Suppose, by contradiction, that U
i
c,t
converged to a value strictly larger than U ic
(
c˜i(µ)
)
, which would imply that consumption levels
would converge to values ĉi < c˜i(µ), so that the consumption-leisure choice would be interior
for at least one of the two spouses when employed. In that case labor income would converge
to ι ≡ wf (1 − l̂f )sf + wm(1 − l̂m)sm, where l̂f and/or l̂m are strictly smaller than 1 and solve
(2.13) and (2.14). ι is a non-degenerate random variable with positive variance, which implies
that the lower or upper bounds on asset holdings would be violated with positive probability,
a contradiction. This follows from the result of Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) that under
β(1 + r) = 1 consumption and asset grow with no bound if income is suitably stochastic. Thus,
U ic,t cannot converge to a value strictly larger than U
i
c
(
c˜i(µ)
)
and it must converge to U ic
(
c˜i(µ)
)
.
Since U ic is invertible, consumption will converge to c˜
i(µ). The budget constraint implies that at
must converge to a˜(µ).
II. Frisch Elasticities of Labor Supply
Since the Pareto weight, µ(x, z), where
x ≡ q
f
1 (1− τ f )w¯f + qf0 bf
qm1 (1− τm)w¯m + qm0 bm
, (II.1)
is a function of female and male wages, Frisch elasticities of labor supply depend both on the
Pareto weight and its derivative with respect to wages. In this Appendix we derive the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply for females and males. For convenience, we write again the first-order
conditions with respect to leisure at an interior solution. If we use Λ to denote the marginal utility
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of wealth, these first-order conditions are
µ(x, z)Ufl =Λw
f (II.2)
(1− µ(x, z))Uml =Λwm. (II.3)
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply, say ηi, of an agent of gender i = f,m captures how her/his
labor supply responds to an intertemporal reallocation of wages that leaves the marginal utility
of wealth unchanged, i.e.
ηi ≡ d(1− l
i)
dwi
wi
1− li
∣∣∣∣
Λ
. (II.4)
For females, the Frisch elasticity can be readily obtained after differentiating equation (II.2) with
respect to wf , which yields
µ1
qf1
qm1 w
m + qm0 b
m
Ufl + µU
f
ll
dlf
dwf
= Λ, (II.5)
where µ1 denotes the derivative of µ with respect to it first argument, x. After plugging the value
for Λ and multiplying through by wf/(1− lf ) one obtains
ηf = − U
f
l
(1− lf )Ufll
(
1− µ1
µ
qf1w
f
qm1 w
m + qm0 b
m
)
. (II.6)
Equivalently, the Frisch elasticity for males can be derived by differentiating (II.3) with respect
to wm,
µ1
xqm1
qm1 w
m + qm0 b
m
Uml + (1− µ)Umll
dlm
dwm
= Λ. (II.7)
After rearranging terms, plugging in the value of Λ from the first-order condition and multiplying
through by wm/(1− lm) gives
ηm = − U
m
l
(1− lm)Umll
(
1− µ1
1− µ
xqm1 w
m
qm1 w
m + qm0 b
m
)
. (II.8)
III. Household Risk Aversion with Intra-household Risk Sharing
In this appendix we derive the coefficient of risk aversion of the two-person collective household
as a function of individual preferences for risk and the relative Pareto weight. We also show that
the derivative of the risk-sharing rule for a household member of gender i = f,m, is given by
the product of the household’s coefficient of risk aversion and the individual’s coefficient of risk
tolerance.
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion of a bachelor household with instantaneous utility function
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U i(c, l) is defined as
ρi ≡ −U
i
cc
U ic
, for i = f,m.
When two individuals with different attitudes towards risk form a household and share risks, the
household’s coefficient of risk aversion is obviously different from the individual ones. Collective
household’s risk preferences will depend on individual preferences and Pareto weights.
Collective Household’s Risk Aversion
Let us denote the utility function of the two-person, collective household over total household
consumption, y, and individual leisures, lf and lm, by u(y, lf , lm;µ). This utility function is
defined as,
u(y, lf , lm;µ) = max
cf ,cm
{µUf (cf , lf ) + (1− µ)Um(cm, lm)}
s.t. = cf + cm = y.
With this utility function we can write the maximization problem solved by the collective house-
hold as,
V˜ (s, a;µ) = max
lf ,lm,a′,c˜
{u(c˜, lf , lm;µ) + β
∑
s′
pis′|sV˜ (s′, a′;µ)}
s.t. c˜+ a′ =
∑
i=f,m
wi(1− li)si +
∑
i=f,m
(1− si)bi + (1 + r)a.
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion of a collective household with Pareto weight µ can then
be defined as,
ρµ ≡ −uyy
uy
.
Let us assume individual utility functions of the form:
U i(c, l) =
c1−σi − 1
1− σi + ϕ
i l
1−γi − 1
1− γi ,
for i = f,m. To derive this coefficient of risk aversion let us consider the first-order condition to
the static maximization problem embedded into the household problem, i.e.,
µ(cf )−σ
f
= (1− µ)(cm)−σm .
Taking logarithms on both sides of this equation and differentiating with respect to y yields,
σf
dcf
dy
1
cf
= σm
dcm
dy
1
cm
.
Using that dc
f
dy +
dcm
dy = 1, we can solve for for dc
f/dy as,
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dcf
dy
=
(
1 +
σf
σm
cm
cf
)−1
.
Now, if we take the derivative of uµ with respect to y, and use the first-order condition gives,
uy = µ(c
f )−σ
f
.
Differentiating this equation with respect to y again yields,
uyy = −σfµ(cf )−σf−1dc
f
dy
.
Then, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of a household with Pareto weight µ is,
ρµ =
σfσm
σmcf + σfcm
,
and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is σ
fσm(cf+cm)
σmcf+σf cm
.
Now, it is straightforward to show that the derivatives of the sharing rules, dc
f
dy and
dcm
dy , are given
by the household’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion, ρµ, times the coefficient of absolute risk
tolerance of each individual in the household. From the first-order condition it is easily obtained
that
dcf
dy
=
(
σfσm
σmcf + σfcm
)
cf
σf
,
where the expression within brackets on the right-hand side is the household’s coefficient of ab-
solute risk aversion and the second term, cf/σf , is the individual’s coefficient of absolute risk
tolerance. The same result can be shown for dc
m
dy .
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Table 1. Baseline Parameters
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Relative risk aversion σ 2 Discount factor βH 0.989
Regulates Frisch elasticity γ 3 Discount factor βL 0.982
Utility weight ϕ 1.27 Share of impatient households χ 0.20
Pareto weight µ 0.575 Unemployment insurance bf 0.083
Derivative Pareto weight µ1 0.038 Unemployment insurance b
m 0.161
Capital share α 0.36 Relative wages λ 0.575
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025
Table 2. Unemployment Insurance and Financial Assets
Elasticity of average assets-to-income
ratio w.r.t. UI replacement rate
Data (Engen and Gruber 2001) −0.28
Collective Household Economy −0.38
Bachelor Household Economy −0.64
Notes: This table shows how household asset holdings respond to the generosity of UI.
Table 3. Female Labor Supply and Male Employment Status
Liquidity-constrained
households All households
Employed Husband 166.0 145.0
Unemployed Husband 180.2 148.8
Notes: This table shows average monthly hours of work by working females in households with employed
and unemployed males in our baseline economy with collective households.
Table 4. UI and Female Labor Supply During Male’s Unemployment Spells
Liquidity-constrained
households All households
10% reduction in bm +0.86% +0.28%
50% reduction in bm +8.71% +1.53%
Notes: This table shows the percentage increase in female labor supply upon a male’s unemployment spell
yielded by 10% and 50% reductions in UI in our economy with collective households.
Table 5. Individual and household consumption loss upon unemployment
(a) Individual consumption loss upon unemployment:
Collective Model Bachelor Model
Liquidity-constrained Liquidity-constrained
individuals All individuals individuals All individuals
Females, 4cf/cf −4.5% −0.92% −23.23% −2.46%
Males, 4cm/cm −8.74% −1.78% −30.09% −2.44%
(b) Fraction of household income loss that transmits to household consumption loss:
Collective Model Bachelor Model
Liquidity-constrained Liquidity-constrained
households All households households All households
4c/4y 17.31% 3.55% 35.66% 3.34%
Notes: Panel (a) of this table presents individual insurance as measured by the percentage of consumption
lost upon an unemployment shock. Panel (b) presents household insurance as measured by the degree of
transmission of income loss to consumption upon an unemployment shock.
Table 6. Elasticity of Household Consumption Loss to UI
Liquidity-constrained
households All households
Data (Browning and Crossley 2001) −0.0922 −0.05
Collective Household Economy −0.0954 −0.0175
Bachelor Household Economy −0.2262 −0.0212
Notes: Sensitivity of household consumption loss upon unemployment with respect to the generosity of UI.
(a) Savings Policy Functions (b) Policy Functions for Hours Worked
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Policy function for net savings (low beta)
Asset Holdings a
a
pr
im
e(s
,a)
 − 
a
 
 
sF = 1, sM = 1
sF = 1, sM = 0
sF = 0, sM = 1
sF = 0, sM = 0
0 5 10 15
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
Policy functions for hours worked (low beta)
Asset Holdings a
H
ou
rs
 w
or
ke
d
 
 
M  −  wife unemployed
M  −  wife employed
F  −  husband unemployed
F  −  husband employed
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Policy function for net savings (high beta)
Asset Holdings a
a
pr
im
e(s
,a)
 − 
a
 
 
sF = 1, sM = 1
sF = 1, sM = 0
sF = 0, sM = 1
sF = 0, sM = 0
0 5 10 15
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
Policy functions for hours worked (high beta)
Asset Holdings a
H
ou
rs
 w
or
ke
d
 
 
M  −  wife unemployed
M  −  wife employed
F  −  husband unemployed
F  −  husband employed
Figure 1: Policy Functions in the Collective Household Economy
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Figure 2: Savings Effect of Intra-household Risk Sharing
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Figure 3: Hours Effect of Intra-household Risk Sharing
